This week’s quote of the week (though it’s only Thursday) concerns arguments for veganism and in particular follows from a defense for veganism that was offered in the discussion period of a recent online event.

Last week, I attended a session of The Collective Ethics Seminar in which Tracy Isaacs gave a presentation entitled “Meat-Eating as Ideology and “Meat-Eaters’ Fragility.” You can find the abstract for the presentation here. The presentation was excellent. Tracy has a wonderfully engaging style of delivery and her remarks were wide-ranging, informative, and well-researched. You may recall that Tracy recently wrote an introductory guest post for BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY on why philosophers with an interest in social justice should care about veganism. You can find that guest post here. And you should anticipate a post from Tracy on veganism and masculinity in the next couple of weeks.

In the presentation, Tracy pointed out that both arguments against cruelty to animals and arguments for sustainability are advanced in order to make a compelling case for veganism. Tracy argues that (1) the former type of argument is sufficient to justify a requirement of veganism and (2) the latter type of argument is not necessary for acceptance of the requirement, though arguments for sustainability should be regarded as an important part of arguments to promote veganism. In other words, Tracy holds that claims against cruelty to animals should be given primacy in arguments against meat-eating and promotions of veganism.

In the discussion period that followed the presentation, one interlocutor gave a memorable response to Tracy’s expressed frustration about resistance to arguments against meat-eating (“meat-eaters’ fragility”) that derive from facts about factory farming and other forms of cruelty inflicted on animals for the benefit of people who use animal products. The interlocutor encouraged Tracy to switch strategies, that is, the interlocutor remarked that

more people would be convinced to come on board with veganism if they were offered sustainability arguments rather than offered cruelty arguments.

As this interlocutor explained it, sustainability arguments do not threaten meat-eaters in the way that cruelty arguments do; that is, cruelty arguments tend to make meat-eaters defensive, while many (meat-eating) people are, more or less, already on board with at least some sustainability arguments—they already do their part by (for instance) shutting off lights when they leave a room, flying less, going paperless, etc.; hence, sustainability arguments are more likely to convince them that they should expand their efforts and become vegan than arguments from cruelty to animals.

Notice, however, that this sort of argument for sustainability is compatible with an argument for merely eating less meat and does not require an argument for eliminating meat from one’s diet altogether. In other words, the argument is not really a defense of, or justification for, veganism at all. Veganism (on this understanding of sustainability) is not necessary for the sustainability argument nor is the sustainability argument sufficient for the promotion of veganism: If flying less rather than not at all is regarded as a worthwhile contribution to sustainability, why shouldn’t one have leeway to eat some meat rather than none? Shouldn’t that stance, too, be considered a worthwhile contribution to sustainability? By contrast, the argument from cruelty for veganism is zero sum. In short, for the conclusion that one must eliminate meat-eating altogether–that is, that one must commit to veganism–we need the argument from cruelty to (all) animals. In short, the argument from cruelty to animals is necessary in addition to sufficient in order to adequately defend and promote veganism.

Not so fast. I want to note that arguments for veganism from cruelty toward animals should always be treated as intertwined with comprehensive arguments for sustainability in general, since human destruction of nonhuman animal habitats (a significant consequence of and contributor to climate change) is itself a form of cruelty to nonhuman animals. Yet we need a different sort of argument for sustainability than the argument that Tracy’s interlocutor articulated. Consistent and impactful arguments about sustainability (that promote veganism) would assume that flying, too, should be relinquished altogether. I indicate here how I have taken this stance.

Indeed, given my commitment to veganism and my stance on air travel and sustainability, I thus disagree with (oppose) the efforts of disabled people (and others) who endeavour to bring about changes to air travel that would make it more usable by a wider range of disabled people. Put directly, I think that their endeavours, which invariably rely on assumptions of liberal individualism, are outdated, prioritize self-interest and personal desires and preferences, and evince a remarkable lack of collective concern and responsibility.

Why are these disabled people fighting for increased involvement in an activity that is as destructive as air travel? The answer seems in part to be that they continue to hold a narrow, individualistic “disability rights”-based understanding of what social justice for disabled people encompasses and requires, an understanding that relies upon a naturalized conception of disability.

These endeavours to compel airlines to make their planes more accessible to disabled people also seem remarkably naive and uninformed. Although (after governments compel them to do so) the airline industry will make some concessions to disabled people who fight for more accessible air travel (and who engage in air travel itself) in order to placate them and encourage them to continue giving their money to airlines, the duty of leaders of the airlines is—first and foremost—to maintain and even increase profits. In other words, concessions will be made only to the extent that they do not infringe upon but rather maximize profits for airlines and their shareholders.

Despite the propaganda and pretenses that disabled people who engage in efforts to make air travel more “inclusive” (and who engage in air travel itself) wish to believe and advance, we should recognize and acknowledge that their desire to be accommodated by the airline industry, that is, their implicit promises to remain paying customers of it, are precisely what the industry projects and expects. Rest assured, furthermore that, notwithstanding propaganda and pretense, politicians such as Pete Buttigieg—the current U.S. Secretary of Transportation—(among others) are working to ensure and safeguard the present and future corporate interests of airlines and their shareholders, not the futures and interests of disabled people. And certainly not the futures and interests of the planet and its nonhuman inhabitants.