We look for stable values mostly for economic reasons: deliberation takes time, attention and other similar limited resources. Thus, even though successful deliberation delivers the right kind of legitimacy we seek, we cannot keep deliberating with everyone every time there is some form of substantial (epistemic, moral, political, aesthetic, whatever) disagreement. Thus, we fix the […]
Crip-pessimism: The Future of Disability Justice?
The following is the script for my presentation at St. Louis University on 01/31/2025 at 2pm. My slides with alt text can be found here: “The true philosophy of history thus consists in the insight that, in spite of all these endless changes and their chaos and confusion, we yet always have before us only […]
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PhiDisSocCh5), Unapologetically Online, December 11-13, 2024: Final Program and Registration Information
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 is free, will unapologetically take place online, and is open to everyone! This conference is co-organized by Shelley Tremain and Jonathan Wolff, with the support of the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PhiDisSocCh5) comprises presentations by disabled philosophers whose cutting-edge research challenges […]
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PhiDisSocCh5), Unapologetically Online, December 11-13, 2024: Final Program and Registration Information
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 is free, will unapologetically take place online, and is open to everyone! This conference is co-organized by Shelley Tremain and Jonathan Wolff, with the support of the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PhiDisSocCh5) comprises presentations by disabled philosophers whose cutting-edge research challenges […]
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PHIDISSOCCH5), Online, December 11-13, 2024: Final Program and Registration Information
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 is free, will take place online, and is open to everyone! This conference is co-organized by Shelley Tremain and Jonathan Wolff, with the support of the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PhiDisSocCh5) comprises presentations by disabled philosophers whose cutting-edge research challenges members […]
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PHIDISSOCCH5), Online, December 11-13, 2024: Final Program and Registration Information
I’m very happy to announce that the final program and registration information are available for Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 (#PHIDISSOCCH5), which I am organizing with Jonathan Wolff and with the support of the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 5 is free, will take place online, and […]
Responsibility and the Exclusion of Neurodivergent People, Other-than-human Animals, and Youths from the “Moral Community”
The following is my presentation for the 41st meeting of the International Social Philosophy Conference. I will be contributing to a panel on blame, equity, and moral community, focusing on the work of P. F. Strawson. Strawson is famous for arguing that moral responsibility is a matter of being able to participate in a “moral community” […]
Registration for Ethics After the Pandemic, Hybrid, Sat. Apr. 15, 2023
I have copied below the poster for Ethics After the Pandemic, the symposium taking place this Saturday at Salisbury University from 9:00am to 3:30pm EST. Karen Stohr and I will give keynotes in the morning and three panels will be held in the afternoon. To join the symposium by Zoom, go here: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/43rd-annual-salisbury-university-philosophy-symposium-tickets-553421337117 Description of […]
Ethics After the Pandemic, Salisbury University, Apr. 15, 2023
Join this day of philosophical reflections on the moral lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic: What do we owe to the most vulnerable among us? Who should be held responsible for the moral failures we saw during the pandemic – individuals, institutions or society as a whole? How can we restore social trust and rebuild community? […]
Max Scheler on the Phenomenology of Value
it is not that feeling that something is valuable gives un defeasible justification to believe that it has value; instead, the relation between feeling and value is not cognitive but constitutive: something is valuable because of how it feels (to us, obviously)
BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 