Social Ontology and Reductive Conceptions of Philosophy of Disability (The Consequences for Disabled Philosophers)

Over the weekend, disabled philosopher Johnathan Flowers once again tweeted a thread about the ableism of the profession and the exclusion of disabled philosophers of disability. In the course of the thread, Johnathan pointed out how philosophers of disability aren’t recognized as (say) doing metaphysics, as philosophers of language, as politiical philosophers, and so on, […]

Elizabeth Barnes’s Difference Principle and the Limitations of (Their) Analytic Philosophy of Disability

This post comprises excerpts from the chapter that I’m writing for The Oxford Handbook of Social Ontology, edited by Sally Haslanger, Brian Epstein, Hans Bernhard Schmid, and Stephanie Collins and forthcoming next year. In the chapter, I draw upon Tina Fernandes Botts’s work on the methodological differences between analytic philosophy and (so-called) Continental philosophy in […]

(How) Is Disability Relevant to the Field of Social Ontology?

The conception of disability that currently prevails in philosophy construes it as a philosophically uninteresting and value-neutral biological trait, that is, as a self-evidently natural and deleterious characteristic, difference, or property that some people embody or possess. Insofar as philosophers hold this naturalized and individualized conception of disability, they assume that disability is a prediscursive […]

Open Questions in Social Ontology

Hsiang-Yun Chen and Sally Haslanger have just edited an special issue on Social Meaning and Reality for the EurAmerica Journal and it features an article by yours truly. This is how they summarize it on their introduction to the special issue: Just as there is a large variety of social categories that an individual can […]

CFA: Criticizing Forms of Life, Groningen, Apr. 1, 2020 (deadline: Dec. 15, 2019)

Organized by the Faculty of Philosophy and the Groningen School of Critical Theory, University of Groningen (NL) Keynote lecture: Rahel Jaeggi Liberal theories often draw a distinction between questions of justice which are capable of being decided in ways justifiable to all concerned and ethical questions, or questions about the “good life”, for which no […]

Philosophy of Disability: Present and Future, No. 3

This series is intended to flesh out some of the remarks that I made in a pivotal paragraph of my reply to commentators in the Pacific APA symposium on Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability. In the previous post in this series, I returned to the paragraph in order to consider the remark according to […]

Philosophy of Disability: Present and Future, No. 1

In my reply to commentators on Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability at the Pacific APA (previously posted on BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY here), I wanted to accomplish a number of things. In addition to offering an exegesis of Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability and responses to critical remarks about the book that the various commentators […]

CFP: Ethnobiology – Perspectives from History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science (deadline: Jul. 20, 2019)

Issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, David Ludwig and Francisco Vergara-Silva (eds.) Ethnobiology is an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of biological and social sciences that studies knowledge systems and practices of Indigenous, traditional, and other local communities. The complexity of biological expertise beyond academia raises both theoretical and […]