As readers and listeners of BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY will know, from Tuesday to Friday of last week, the third edition of Philosophy, Disability and Social Change — Philosophy, Disability and Social Change 3 #PhiDisSocCh3 — took place online. The conference was a huge success with radical, innovative, insightful, and provocative presentations and discussions over the course […]
Hirji and the Naturalization of Oppression
Features of the methodology of analytic philosophy that, according to Tina Fernandes Botts, render it inadequate for work in critical philosophical work on race and racism can likewise be recognized in analytic philosophy of disability. My argument is that these features of analytic philosophy render it inadequate for the articulation of a conception of disability […]
Bioethics (De)Mystified: A Foucauldian Argument For Why Bioethics Must Be Abolished
In “Bioethics as a Technology of Government,” the fifth chapter of Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability, I assert that bioethics emerged as a technology of government to resolve the problem that the production of disability poses for the neoliberal management of societies (Tremain 2017, pp. 159-202). In particular, disability is constituted as a problem […]
Against Exotic Philosophy, Again
When we approach other people’s thoughts, especially those that might prima facie to be very different from us, culturally, geographically, historically, etc., there is always the temptation to think that trying to fit their thought into our current epistemological, aesthetic, ontological, etc. categories would require forcing it into a conceptual straitjacket and that instead one […]
Dialogues on Disability: Shelley Tremain Interviews Gen Eickers
Hello, I’m Shelley Tremain and I’d like to welcome you to the ninety-first installment of Dialogues on Disability, the series of interviews that I am conducting with disabled philosophers and post to BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY on the third Wednesday of each month. The series is designed to provide a public venue for discussion with disabled philosophers […]
Max Scheler on the Phenomenology of Value
it is not that feeling that something is valuable gives un defeasible justification to believe that it has value; instead, the relation between feeling and value is not cognitive but constitutive: something is valuable because of how it feels (to us, obviously)
About the Ableism That Conditions Your Criticisms of Zoom (Again)
I’ve reposted (from June 2022) this explanation of how ableism undergirds the veneration and continued production of in-person-only philosophy conferences and workshops because I increasingly see notices and announcements about them in philosophical venues. For my part, I have made the decision to not promote in-person-only conferences on BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. That is why you see […]
On miscontextualizing history
we can interpret historical texts either as saying something particular about their concrete context of creation, or something more general about more abstract philosophical problems – which therefore would still be relevant to philosophical discussions todays, but it would be a mistake to interpret those texts directly in our context as if they had been written today
Matters of Moral Taste
according to Rudy’s Strawsonian model of responsibility, there are matters of moral and political TASTE, so that just as it does not make sense to ask whether pistachio deserved my distaste for it, so it is nonsense to ask whether someone deserves indignation or resentment
Preliminary Program for Philosophy, Disability, and Social Change 3 (#PhiDisSocCh3), Zoom/Online, Dec. 6-9, 2022
Below you will find the preliminary program for the amazing Philosophy, Disability, and Social Change 3 (#PhiDisSocCh3) conference that takes place December 6-8, 13:00-18:20 GMT/8:00-13:20 EST/5-10:20 PST and Dec. 9 13:00-19:00 GMT/8:00-14:00 EST/5:00-11:00 PST. Registration and additional information for this pathbreaking conference will be made available soon! The schedule below (and henceforth) is in GMT. […]
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