¿Siempre debemos hacerle el bien a la gente?

Una de las preguntas centrales de la filosofía moral es ¿cuándo estamos justificados a no hacerle un bien a alguien? Es decir, si sabemos que hay algo que podemos hacer y que le haría un bien a alguien (entendido este “alguien” en un sentido suficientemente amplio para cubrir tanto a individuos como colectividades, tanto a […]

Publication: When Moral Responsibility Theory Met My Philosophy of Disability

The (penultimate, i.e., uncopyedited) version of my article “When Moral Responsibility Theory Met My Philosophy of Disability” is now on PhilPapers here: https://philpapers.org/rec/TREWMR The article will appear in Mich Ciurria’s special issue of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly on feminist approaches to moral responsibility theory. The abstract for the article appears below: In this article, I aim to demonstrate […]

Inaugural Stuart Hall Essay Prize (deadline: Nov. 6, 2023)

The Stuart Hall Foundation is pleased to invite submissions for the inaugural Stuart Hall Essay Prize. Open to submissions from UK-based entrants aged 18 to 30 inclusive, the prize invites new and unpublished writing that connects with Stuart Hall’s ideas and impacts broad public discourse. The prize will award £2,000 to a selected writer whose […]

Why do we even teach logic, and to whom?

At. A recent meeting of the buenos Aires Logic Group in Argentina, Sara Uckelman, from Durham University in the UK, gave a very interesting talk on the importance of the history of logic. For starters, by “the history of logic”, she did not mean (just) who proved what or who developed which technique, etc. Instead, […]

Say Goodbye to Moral Responsibility Theory As You Know It

My article in Mich CIurria’s forthcoming special issue of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly on Feminist Approaches to Moral Responsibility contributes to growing discussions within philosophy about the ways in which and the extent to which philosophers are culpable with respect to the production and perpetuation of unjust social and political arrangements. A central motivational assumption of […]

Are Amy Mullin and Michael Cholbi Experts on MAiD?

As I have pointed out in numerous posts on BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, liberal feminist bioethicists/philosophers have been at the forefront of the eugenics movement in Canada for quite some time. So, I wasn’t surprised to see the publication announcement of Amy Mullin and Kayla Wiebe’s recent article in which these liberal feminist bioethicists in the Department […]

Why You Shouldn’t Take Too Seriously This Entry on Disability in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Within both the discipline and profession of philosophy, the exact nature of the differences between two methodological approaches—namely, (so-called) analytic philosophy and (so-called) continental philosophy—has been a contested matter and source of controversy for quite some time, in part because these approaches embody disparate institutional positions with respect to status and prestige. Although analytic philosophy […]

Polishing the Silver(s)

I recently had the distinct pleasure of attending an online presentation that Sara Ahmed gave at UC Berkeley. The presentation was motivated by a discussion of the terms polite and polish and their connotations and derivatives. Anyone who has read Ahmed’s work will know that their analyses often revolve around careful dissection of terms and […]

What Canadian Philosophers Won’t Do

Someone could easily come up with a host of things that Canadian feminist philosophers would, predictably, refuse to do, including invite a “gender-critical” feminist philosopher to keynote at an annual CSWIP conference and promote (on social media and elsewhere) a philosopher who is a notorious sexual harasser of his philosophy graduate students. No group of […]

Ableism in Philosophy According to ChatGPT

I have copied below the discussion I had with ChatGPT about ableism, philosophy, bioethics, and feminist philosophy. My requests for information are in bold. I found the ChatGPT responses instructive insofar as they seemed merely to rehearse conventional, (neo)liberal definitions of what disability is, what ableism is, what counts as ableist, what bioethics is and […]