Last week, Daily Nous reported that a proposal to cut the philosophy programme at the University of Kent was approved. In the late summer and fall of 2023, we saw the impassioned notices on Daily Nous and in other forums about the closing of the Dianoia Institute. Two weeks ago, I and others commented on a post at Daily Nous about sexual harassment in philosophy (and academia more broadly).

What these events–departmental and other institutional closings, on the one side, and sexual harassment, on the other–have in common is that both have been described as an “institutional failure”. Do the similarities between these events end there? For while these events have been similarly described as failure at the institutional level, responses to them have nevertheless differed markedly.

In the first case, that is, the excision of philosophy departments and closure of institutes, the loudest response has been some variation on these assertions:

“[These philosophers] are actively looking for posts elsewhere” and “offer them jobs“

In the second case, that is, the case of sexual harassment, the response was:

“In cases like this, of institutional failure, it may be that the only reasonable attitude to have is to doubt that any official action will be taken in response to sexual harassment. If that’s the only reasonable attitude to have, and you know this, what kind of advice or support should you offer to a victim of sexual harassment when they report their experiences to you? What should you tell a junior faculty member, for example, or a graduate student, to do, if following the proper procedures will not help them (or future victims), but instead will likely just expose them to the risk of retaliation?”

In the former case(s), that is, departmental closures, the “institutional failure” was met with profession-wide outrage and attempts to address the material and institutional consequences of the “failure.” We know from several subsequent announcements at Daily Nous that these prospective jobs have been forthcoming in haste, especially for the researchers and faculty of the esteemed Dianoia Institute (most of whom seem to be nondisabled white men). Indeed, the urgency with which their situation has been met might be best referred to as “whirlwind” or “breathtaking.”

With respect to the latter case(s), the case of sexual harassment, the “institutional failure” was entirely privatized and personalized (“document everything,” “get a lawyer,” “contact the local sexual assault centre for a referral to a therapist,” etc), that is, the “institutional failure” of (sexual) harassment met with a resounding yawn. Didn’t happen to me, won’t happen to me, not my problem, and so forth.

In short, no one showed up to (for instance) suggest the development of an informal or coordinated program whereby philosophers victimized would be given priority for positions, though that clearly was the remedy informally (and explicitly) implemented in the case of the Dianoia Institute and other institutional closings. Instead, philosophers victimized by sexual harassment/assault were told (once again) to take the(ir) problem elsewhere.

The privatization of harassment and assault in this way is of course a mechanism of the institutional privatization and reinforcement of ableism, racism, sexism, and classism, given that subjects subordinated by these apparatuses of power are disproportionately victimized, especially disabled and racialized subjects.

Now, it would be easy to attribute the disparate responses that have accrued with respect to these “institutional failures” to their disparate proximity to issues of confidentiality and anonymity. The identities of the (fired) faculty of the University of Kent and the Dianoia Institute are widely known and recognized. Since the identities of these philosophers are widely known, they can be openly discussed. Furthermore, since the identities of these philosophers are widely known: so, too, are their respective statures and prestige.

Indeed, this, I maintain, is the reason why no concerted, profession-wide remedy has been forthcoming for philosophers who have been victimized by sexual harassment, why there has been no open-door employment redress, no outrage on our behalf, namely, responses to “institutional failures” are highly selective in the neoliberal corporate university, even amongst liberals and other “progressives”. Anonymity would evade this selectivity. As I wrote in a previous post,

Beyond support and sympathy, what else are philosophers willing to give victims of sexual harassment in philosophy? A job? Are they willing to forego their prestige bias in order to hire victimized philosophers who lack a certain pedigree but whose careers have been (virtually) ruined due to harassment? Are they willing to forego specialized searches to prioritize the placement of victims of harassment (of any kind) in new jobs, regardless of areas of specialization and type of training? Is securing a spousal hire more important than hiring a victimized philosopher? What’s more important: hiring a wildly prolific and accomplished philosopher or hiring a victim who rarely publishes?

If a victimized philosopher challenges you on your ableism, racism, or heterosexism is that good grounds to disregard her situation? If you perceive that a victim has insulted you in some way, say, on social media, are you justified in your disregard for the fact that they have been harassed? In other words, are philosophers entitled to be selective about who they recognize as victims, the extent to which they support them, how they support them, and so on?