Everything American is more: more interesting, more special, more problematic, more controversial, more important, more urgent, more radical, more insightful, more progressive, more invested, more pertinent, more attention-grabbing, more useful, more instructive, more informed.

So it should surprise no one that the participation of American philosopher Alex Byrne in the production of “Treatment of Pediatric Gender Dysphoria”—a document published in early May 2025 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Sciences—has garnered far more attention and ridicule amongst philosophers, especially feminist philosophers, than the invaluable guidance and instruction that Canadian philosophers such as Udo Schüklenk and Daniel Weinstock provided (and continue to supply) to Canada’s Liberal Government for its MAiD regime and the expanding enshrinement of it into law.

Indeed, most oppositional (American) philosophers (including feminist bioethicists and so-called disability bioethicists) have demonstrated time and again that they are uninformed about how productive relations of power have conditioned the inculcation of MAiD in Canada and how the MAiD regime and the practices that it comprises actually operate here, falling back instead on the outdated liberal arguments of Schüklenk, Ronald Dworkin, Wayne Sumner, and others.

Of course, the identification of the more-ness of Americana, that is, its exceptionalism, is not the only explanation that should be provided for the disproportionate attention given to the actions of the former philosopher over the actions of the others. On the contrary, one must also consider that the latter demand to be obscured because they are integral to and indispensable for the growth and sustenance of the subfield of bioethics, an increasingly vital money-making arm of neoliberal philosophy departments and universities internationally.

Furthermore, the disproportionate attention that philosophers, especially feminist philosophers, have paid to Byrne’s collusion with the current U.S. administration sustains the ableist, classist, and racist injustices of philosophy in other ways, including by rendering the apparatus of gender—in isolation from other apparatuses of social power and the injustices that they (re)produce—the more, or rather, most, dire source of injustice within philosophy and beyond in this historical and cultural moment. In short, the disproportionate attention given to Byrne’s actions secures the interests and agenda of institutionally privileged nondisabled white feminist philosophy, more.