(How) Is Disability Relevant to the Field of Social Ontology?

The conception of disability that currently prevails in philosophy construes it as a philosophically uninteresting and value-neutral biological trait, that is, as a self-evidently natural and deleterious characteristic, difference, or property that some people embody or possess. Insofar as philosophers hold this naturalized and individualized conception of disability, they assume that disability is a prediscursive […]

Disabled Philosopher Seeks Your Assistance

In the course of last month’s Dialogues on Disability interview, Nathan Moore talked about his fears for the future given the systematic exclusion of disabled philosophers—especially disabled philosophers of disability—from adequate employment in Canadian philosophy departments in particular and philosophy departments more generally. I share Nathan’s fears. I am unemployed, despite the fact that I […]

Philosophy and Structural Gaslighting About Disability

Philosophers generally do not regard critical examination of disability as suitable to research and teaching in social metaphysics and social epistemology; nor do they, generally, appreciate the critical importance of philosophy of disability but rather remain resolute that philosophical inquiry about disability is appropriately and adequately conducted in the established subfield of bioethics. Indeed, a […]

The Singer/Lindauer Entry Won! But Why?

As per comments that I have made in the Teaching Practical and Applied Ethics Facebook group, let me say this: The winner of The Splintered Mind contest (go here) that solicited arguments designed to convince people to donate to charity, namely, the Singer/Lindauer entry about an effort to prevent “blindness,” reproduces ableism and ableist biases […]