In a post at the end of 2020, I mentioned that early in 2021 I would send out invitations to a pathbreaking edited collection on philosophy of disability. The invitations have been sent out and confirmed; and I have assigned a title to the book. So, here are a few details that I can share […]
Why Nursing-Home Incarceration Must End
On Wednesday of this week, the Auditor General of Ontario, Bonnie Lysyk, released her report on the catastrophic events that have occurred in Ontario nursing homes during the past pandemic year and the Ford Progressive Conservative government’s response to them. The report identified systemic underfunding, staff shortages, lack of PPE, lack of infection control, shared […]
Dialogues on Disability: Shelley Tremain With Alex Bryant
Hello, I’m Shelley Tremain and I’d like to welcome you to the sixth-anniversary installment of Dialogues on Disability, the series of interviews that I’m conducting with disabled philosophers and post to BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY on the third Wednesday of each month. The series is designed to provide a public venue for discussion with disabled philosophers about a […]
Elizabeth Barnes’s Difference Principle and the Limitations of (Their) Analytic Philosophy of Disability, Part II
In a previous post, I offered a *draft* excerpt from a section of my contribution to The Oxford Handbook of Social Ontology, edited by Sally Haslanger, Stephanie Collins, Brian Epstein, and Hans Bernhard Schmid and forthcoming next year. As I noted in that post, the chapter draws upon Tina Fernandes Botts’s work on the methodological […]
Philosophy of Disability and the Critical Disability Studies Conference at York
Later today, I will give a Keynote presentation entitled “Philosophy of Disability, Critical Disability Studies, and the Nursing Home-Industrial-Complex” to the Annual York University Critical Disability Studies Conference. Due to the pandemic, this year’s conference is taking place over four consecutive Wednedays this month. I’m delighted to have the opportunity to share my work on […]
CFP: Reel Politics: Film, Radical Politics, and Solidarity, University of Guelph Online, May 26-27, 2021 (deadline: Apr. 15, 2021)
This May, the Reel Politics conference, hosted by the University of Guelph Department of Philosophy, will meet online as a forum to explore a range of topics pertaining to film and radical politics. Participants will have the opportunity to present philosophical responses to film as an important site of experiencing and reasoning about political culture, particularly as they relate to immediate justice movements and crises, such as anthropogenic climate […]
CFP: 2021 Virtual Conference for Underrepresented Students in Philosophy, Online, May 8th, 2021 (deadline: Apr. 16, 2021)
2021 Virtual Conference for Underrepresented Students in Philosophy We invite undergraduate students and master’s students to submit papers for the 2021 Conference for Under-Represented Students in Philosophy. Submissions are due April 16, 2021. The virtual conference will be held via Zoom on May 8, 2021. Conference participants (undergraduate students and master’s students) will have the opportunity to present […]
Dialogues on Disability: Shelley Tremain Interviews Jennifer Scuro
Hello, I’m Shelley Tremain and I’d like to welcome you to the seventy-second installment of Dialogues on Disability, the series of interviews that I am conducting with disabled philosophers and post to BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY on the third Wednesday of each month. The series is designed to provide a public venue for discussion with disabled philosophers […]
Discipline and Punish: Canadian Philosophy, Bill C-7, and Scapegoating
I wanted to write you a post in response to the passage of Bill C-7 in the Canadian House of Commons last week, the vote that, after the Senate signs off on it, will have made euthanasia in Canada entirely legal, that is, the vote that now enables physicians to offer their disabled patients, including […]
(How) Is Disability Relevant to the Field of Social Ontology?
The conception of disability that currently prevails in philosophy construes it as a philosophically uninteresting and value-neutral biological trait, that is, as a self-evidently natural and deleterious characteristic, difference, or property that some people embody or possess. Insofar as philosophers hold this naturalized and individualized conception of disability, they assume that disability is a prediscursive […]
