there is not one such thing as being right. We use normative language like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ for many purposes – to talk about what we should do from a first person perspective and to talk about how to judge other people’s actions from a third person perspectives (singular and plural), about who to praise and who to blame, about how to deal with the consequences of our actions and about how to assign responsibilities, etc.
Opposition to Bill C-7 and Too Many Letters of Reference
No, this post isn’t taking on the important work done on The Philosophers’ Cocoon blog by advising philosophy job applicants about the appropriate contents of their dossier. Rather this post draws upon past interventions that I’ve made on BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY and on the earlier Discrimination and Disadvantage blog (here, here, and here) to reiterate that […]
Videos of the Philosophy, Disability and Social Change Conference, Oxford Online, Dec. 9-11, 2020
Watch the exciting presentations made at the Philosophy, Disability and Social Change conference that Jonathan Wolff and I co-organized with funding and technical and other support from the Blavatnik School of Government at University of Oxford! All of the presentations constitute groundbreaking, cutting-edge philosophy of disability!
My Presentation to the Philosophy, Disability, and Social Change Conference, Online, December 9th, 2020
I have copied below the text of the presentation that I delivered on Wednesday, December 9th, the first day of the enormously successful Philosophy, Disability, and Social Change conference. The chair of the session was Eric Winsberg who did a fantastic job. The presentation copied here is an abbreviated draft of an article that will […]
Philosophy, Disability and Social Change, Oxford Online – Only One Week Away! (Updated)*
*As of December 8th, 997 people had registered for this conference. Philosophy, Disability and Social Change, the open access, free, and online conference that Jonathan Wolff and I have organized through the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, begins a week today! Close to 800 people have registered for this pathbreaking conference. Have you? […]
Letter to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the Government of Canada in Opposition to Bill C-7
This morning, as per Catherine Frazee’s request, I submitted a letter to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the Canadian Government. The letter articulates my opposition to Bill C-7, which would expand access to medically-assisted suicide (“MAID”) for disabled people. Given the dearth of disabled philosophers (of disability) in Canadian philosophy, […]
Bioethics, Catherine Frazee, and MAID in Canada
In a previous post, I discussed the role that bioethicists in Canada, including feminist bioethicists, have played in the development in Canada of legislation and public policy designed to facilitate medically-assisted suicide and subsequent expansion of it. This set of events should be recognized as the incremental normalization of power relations that I discuss in […]
Abstract for Arché Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar, St. Andrews, Wednesday, November 4th, 2020
Some readers/listeners of BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY have asked about the direction of the argument in my presentation to the Arché Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar at University of St. Andrews next week. So, I have copied the abstract for the presentation below. The seminar runs from 2-4pm GMT. If you would like to join the […]
¿Hay cosas que no debe comprar el dinero? La propuesta de Paulette Dieterlen
Tradicionalmente se piensa que los lujos están bien distribuidos por el mercado, pero que los bienes de salud deberían distribuirse por las necesidades y el acceso al ejercicio de ciertas actividades, como la medicina, debería distribuirse a través de mecanismos de verificación de mérito. Pero, ¿cuál es la regla general detrás de estas convicciones?
Philosophy and Structural Gaslighting About Disability
Philosophers generally do not regard critical examination of disability as suitable to research and teaching in social metaphysics and social epistemology; nor do they, generally, appreciate the critical importance of philosophy of disability but rather remain resolute that philosophical inquiry about disability is appropriately and adequately conducted in the established subfield of bioethics. Indeed, a […]