Readers of this blog are no doubt aware of Donald Trump’s penchant for suing his critics and political enemies to silence them. Trump has filed billions of dollars’ worth of frivolous or retaliatory defamation lawsuits against major news outlets, including The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, CBS News, CNN, the BBC, and others. Many of these lawsuits were dismissed in court, but they imposed substantial legal cost on defendants, potentially deterring future reporting on Trump’s corruption. As Kelly Kiely and Lyrissa B. Lidsky put it, “Trump appears to use lawsuits as a strategic weapon designed to silence his enemies and critics – who sometimes seem to be one and the same in his eyes.” Due to the loss of advertising revenue in the internet era, news outlets are often forced to settle rather than fight defamation claims, making it harder to enforce constitutional protections on freedom of speech. Trump has also filed lawsuits against private individuals, who are even less capable of financing a prolonged legal defense, and may go bankrupt before a judgment is reached. 

The technical term for this legal maneuver is a Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation, or SLAPP. When tyrants don’t like what critics have to say, they SLAPP them with litigation. Clearly, SLAPP suits fall under the banner of epistemic oppression, though not much is said about them in the Social Epistemology literature. Nonetheless, some philosophers are intimately familiar with the use of litigation – or threats thereof – as an epistemic weapon. 

Indeed, SLAPP-like tactics can be traced back to Western philosophy’s beginnings, when, according to Plato’s Apology, Socrates was sentenced to death for being “a curious person, who searches into things under the Earth and in heaven,” questioning religious figures and cultural elites. Tyrants have always used the law to silence their critics, and Trump is no exception. Unfortunately, there are academics and public intellectuals who have followed Trump’s example, deploying litigation as a blunt instrument to smother criticism and exert control over the marketplace of ideas. This exercise in epistemic tyranny is the mark of a coward, someone afraid of being exposed as a charlatan in the arena of democratic debate.       

Jordan Peterson, who fancies himself a philosopher despite not having a philosophical background, is one such coward. He filed a defamation lawsuit (which he later dropped) against Wilfrid Laurier University and three faculty members over a private meeting with a Teaching Assistant. He also threatened to sue feminist philosopher Kate Manne over a review of his self-help book, in which she called some of his ideas misogynistic. This is ironic, given that Peterson describes men as the “stronger sex,” yet he hides behind specious litigation instead of confronting his critics with facts and evidence – the very practice he claims to support unconditionally as a defender of free speech. The hypocrisy is stunning.

In a similar manner, Brian Leiter, who does have philosophical credentials, threatened to sue fellow philosopher Carrie Jenkins for writing a blog post pledging to “treat other philosophers with respect” and “not treat other philosophers or their work in ways that are belittling, trivializing and/or exclusionary.” He took this statement to refer to himself, although he was not named. In the same litigious email, he described Jenkins as a “sanctimonious asshole,” according to the University of British Columbia’s independent student newspaper. Yet Jenkins did not threaten counter-litigation, proving that she is neither sanctimonious nor litigious. 

In another incident, Jason Brennan casually threatened to sue Christian Coons in a comment thread on Daily Nous – a claim Coons apparently took very seriously, pleading not to be sued. This is not even the first time Brennan has allegedly threatened to sue a philosopher. 

Other philosophers have privately shared details with me about academics threatening to sue them for expressing criticism or dissent. Needless to say, such threats are utterly unphilosophical, exhibiting a fear of Socratic dialogue and an inversion of democracy. It cannot be overlooked that the one making the threat is always someone in a position of privilege and authority, whereas the victim is always in a position of relative disadvantage and vulnerability (a student, adjunct, junior philosopher – someone with limited financial means). The use of litigation as a silencing tactic is meant to entrench these asymmetries of power. 

While SLAPPs do not figure prominently in the literature on epistemic injustice, they represent a growing threat in academia – one that will only intensify as the rising tide of fascism enables powerful people to exercise control over the legal system and the sphere of public discourse. The use of these tactics in academia should not be kept behind closed doors or confined to whisper networks. Knowledge-sharing and organised resistance are needed to protect marginalised philosophers, and philosophy itself, from epistemic tyranny.